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ABSTRACT: This essay aims to present, but not fully substantiate, a way of undermin-
ing the notion of ‘ultimate interpreter’ in the sense of ‘a limited, appointed or elected, 
institutional body.’
One effective way of such presentation is, as I argue, in terms of interpretation of 
Hobbes’s theory as a response to the problem of political ambiguity. Thus inter-
preted, Hobbes’s theory presses on us the choice between normative and non-nor-
mative view of language. If we endorse the former, the argument against ‘ultimate 
interpreter(s)’ seems to hold.
However, one can to a degree blunt the argument’s razor by making the status of the 
body dependent fully on the body’s theoretical performance, so that practical finality 
of the body’s deliberations tracks their theoretical finality, not the other way around.
KEYWORDS: Hobbes, legal interpretation, normative view of language, political ambi-
guity, ultimate interpreter.
“I tell, I am not told. I am a verb, not an object” 
(King George in ‘The Madness of King George’ 
(1994) movie directed by Nicholas Hytner)
Let us imagine that somebody proposes a five-step argument of the following 
kind:*
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a) To resolve large and important social/political conflicts involves, fre-
quently enough, the constructing of the most plausible interpreta-
tion of either ambiguous constitutional provisions, or of a joint effect 
of an interpretable cluster of moral/political norms, that are relevant 
for the theme of the said conflicts.
b) To construct the most plausible interpretation of the kind means to 
construct the most plausible, or defensible, theory in the sense of a 
relatively exhaustive narrative which draws on a set of valid and plau-
sible premises/reasons, and ultimately issues in a conclusion(s) that 
instantiates the most plausible interpretation.
c) Designation, or election, of a limited institutional body, be it a collec-
tive one or individual (such as a committee, commission, govern-
ment, court, or a president), with the purpose of performing the 
task as defined in a), implies a decision to determine beforehand the 
question of which group, institution, body, or an individual, should 
deliver the most plausible theory in the sense of b).
d) The most plausible theory must not be self-validating, which implies 
that it must not be, either by institutional or some other means, safe-
guarded against some plausible counter-reasons. The most plausible 
theory is determined by, and built on, reasons alone, and the flow of 
reasons and counter-reasons should not be steered beforehand either 
in a social, institutional, or political sense.
e) Since c) seems to be incompatible with d), it is prima facie wrong, and 
ultimately harmful, to design by any method an institutional body, a 
locus of sovereignty, to act as a guarantor of the conflict resolution, or 
to perform the tasks, and meet the challenges, as described by a).
There are a number of questions one can pose to the scholar starting 
to think of the ways to defend the five-step argument. First, is there a way 
to present the argument in a more concrete form, that is, is there a way to 
give more concrete meaning to the key terms addressed in the argument? 
Secondly, are there some further arguments and views that the potential de-
fender of the five step argument should recognize as his implicit argumenta-
tive commitments?
This paper will attempt to demonstrate that the answer to the questions 
is in the positive. Hence, the paper’s only argument is to the effect that there 
may be a defensible version of the five-step argument, a version which com-
mits one to some clearly specified, and not other, doctrines and arguments. 
The paper does not supply the reasons for actually endorsing the five-step ar-
gument; it is a paper of ‘if-then’ kind. It argues only that, if one accepts some 
views or theories, then s/he is likely to accept, or deem as highly plausible, 
the five-step argument. Those further arguments in support of such views or 
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theories are not addressed or defended here. This may be taken as a serious 
shortcoming of the paper, but the following are my reasons for proposing it: 
first, sometimes it is extremely important to be aware of the wider conceptual/
argumentative terrain within which one operates; secondly, the awareness of 
the kind should be taken as, and achieved, prior to the actual substantiating 
of the views a social scholar deems as worthy of defending; and thirdly, such 
more general, and wider, approach makes us sufficiently appreciative of the 
fact that, whenever we defend a complex and pretty abstract social or politi-
cal argument, we are bound to defend in parallel several distinct theories that 
normally cross the established disciplinary boundaries.
When it comes to the five-step argument, the idea proposed here is that 
one can develop a more concrete form of the argument through a discussion 
of Hobbes’s political theory1 in terms of a theory of political ambiguity. In 
other words, one of the purposes of this essay is to frame Hobbes’s political 
theory as a kind of response to the problem of political ambiguity and by thus 
framing it to elucidate the key terms and moves of the five-step argument. 
The second key purpose of this essay is to build the awareness of conceptual 
and argumentative connections between the five-step argument, on the one 
hand, and some further views and perspectives, on the other. In the third 
section of the essay I address some of more immediate implications of the 
five-step argument and finish with discussing some ways of responding to it 
so as to perhaps blunt its razor.
Ambiguity as a problem of political theory and Hobbes
Ambiguity is a word, sentence, or a text, that is open to at least two, prima 
facie mutually irreconcilable and potentially equally viable, interpretations. 
In other words, ambiguity is a pattern of language to which one, taking into 
account all the factors required for an interpretation, can attribute at least 
two mutually incompatible, and merely potential, meanings (For a more 
detailed explanation of the notion of ambiguity, see Pehar 2001 and Pehar 
2005). Hence, it is not difficult to understand why ambiguity, when viewed 
through the lens of a political theorist, may be presented and considered as 
a dangerous thing. As there are always at least two ‘horns’ to any ambiguity, 
one ‘horn’ may always be used to deceive or mislead one’s opponent, or to 
generate a situation of persistent, prima facie non-opposable and undefeat-
able, opposition to one’s opponent. Ambiguity may be viewed as a verbal 
means of perpetuation of conflict; hence, political theorist needs to find a 
plausible means of addressing the issue and resolving it.
1 In the following, my focus is almost entirely on Leviathan, “the greatest single work of 
political thought in the English language,” according to Rawls (2007: 23). 
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As Quentin Skinner plausibly demonstrates in a number of his books 
and essays on Hobbes (for an example, see Skinner 1996: esp. 19–40), the 
latter was, first and foremost, deeply immersed into the rhetorical and hu-
manistic culture of Renaissance England. Hobbes, in forming his views of 
language and human nature in general, drew on classical rhetorical sources, 
and studied all the major classical Greco-Roman texts. This, as we shall see, is 
important for understanding his perspective on ambiguity. Secondly, as Skin-
ner also plausibly argued, there was one particular rhetorical strategy with 
which Hobbes was very concerned.2 It is the strategy of paradiastole which 
consists in ‘ambiguation’ of the terms of moral praise and blame. In other 
words, imagine that your opponent claims that one is a coward. The strategy 
of paradiastole consists in one’s prima facie plausible demonstration to the 
effect that what looks like a practice, to which the attribute of ‘cowardice’ 
deserves to be attributed, may be reinterpreted by adding some additional 
contextual factors; consequently, such ‘cowardice’ may in fact be pictured or 
presented as an instance of prudence, or of an intelligent and timely caution. 
This means that the key terms of moral praise and blame are open-ended and 
inherently ambiguous. The description to the effect that ‘the practice X is 
of such-and-such moral character’ is always open to reinterpretation, which 
implies that it may hide another layer of meaning by which one can always 
oppose one’s opponent’s only initial, but not necessarily true or pertinent, 
description.
Hobbes’s view of ambiguity, which fully coincides with the view pre-
sented in the first paragraph of this section, was formed through his reading 
of at least four key texts concerning the linguistic, and very political, phe-
nomenon.
First, in his De Officiis Cicero (Cicero 1921: I 33) relates the story of 
a Spartan King Cleomenes who ruled from 520 till 491 BC: the King has 
signed a truce with a neighboring city stipulating that the truce would last 
for thirty days (triginta dierum). However, Cleomenes attacked the city long 
before the expiry of the stipulated date, and raided its fields. He explained 
that his action was fully in accordance with the agreement on the truce as 
he attacked during a night, not during a day. The truce speaks of days, not 
nights; hence, Cleomenes claimed his assault was in harmony with the letter 
of the document he signed. Cicero comments on this by claiming that this 
represented a ‘malitiosa interpretation juris’, a malicious legal interpretation 
that confirms the old proverb ‘summum jus summa injuria’, or ‘the more 
one extends the law the more one commits a legal injury.’ In other words, 
Cleomenes exploited what he considered to be an ambiguity inherent in the 
word ‘days’ in order to mislead, and catch by surprise, his opponent. He took 
2 See Skinner (2002a) and (2002b) and Thornton (2005: esp. 39–40). 
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the word in its photo-logical sense, not in a chronological sense. There is no 
doubt that Hobbes was aware of the text as it was a part of his curriculum.
Secondly, in The Histories Herodotus relates the story of a Lydian King, 
Croesus, who was, as it was generally argued, misled by Delphi, the famous 
prophecy site (Herodotus 1993: I.53–I.91). Delphi told Croesus that “should 
he decide to launch attack against the Persians, he would destroy a mighty 
empire” (Herodotus 1993: I. 53). Croesus took this to mean that he would 
destroy the Persian Empire against which he was about to launch a preemp-
tive attack. However, ultimately, the prophecy materialized in a different way. 
Croesus was defeated, and has thus destroyed his own empire, which was 
mighty one too. One also needs to note here that Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, 
Book III, uses the same prophecy to illustrate the very nature of ambiguity. 
Drawing on the experience of the poor Lydian King, Aristotle claims that 
ambiguity serves to hide one’s ignorance, or to misrepresent some informa-
tion to some and thus mislead them, as Delphi did with Croesus. Hence, un-
less there is some other purpose, Aristotle argues, the use of ambiguity needs 
to be avoided (Aristotle 1877: 1407a32–1407b6). Again, Hobbes was not 
only familiar with the text, but he provided a rough English translation of it, 
borrowed from it without acknowledgment and, most importantly, held the 
book in high regard (Skinner 1996: 38–9). Also, in Leviathan Hobbes (Hob-
bes 1994: 69), in full agreement with Aristotle, put his view of Delphi as 
follows: “…the ambiguous or senseless answers of the priests at Delphi, Delos, 
Ammon, and other famous oracles (which answers were made ambiguous by 
design, to own [i.e. claim] the event both ways…).”
Thirdly, in 1629 Hobbes translated The History of Peloponnesian Warfare 
by Thucydides (Skinner 1996: 238–9, and Ball 1995: 90–91), the third book 
of which contains the famous description of the sedition in Corcyra in the 
course of which the use of language was fully paradiastolic. As Thucydides 
relates, the words had changed their ordinary meanings, and the warring 
parties started using them in the ways opposed to the previous, peace-time 
one. For instance, the acts that used to be called ‘prudent’ were now called ‘a 
cowardice and weakness,’ and in a typical example of an abuse of the ambigu-
ity of moral terms that characterized the revolution in Corcyra, Thucydides 
points out that, “the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high 
reputation.”
Fourthly, in 1606 the English Parliament introduced the following 
clause into the Oath of Allegiance that the Catholic members, and priests, 
had to take to confirm their loyalty to the Protestant England: “I do plainly 
and sincerely acknowledge and swear, according to these express words by 
me spoken and according to the plain and common sense understanding of 
the same words, without any equivocation or secret reservation whatsoever” 
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(Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 210). Now, why had they decided to forbid of-
ficially equivocation, or the use of ambiguity, which in itself is a very strange 
decision? The reason for this is in the doctrine of equivocation that some of 
the English Catholic and Jesuit scholars adopted again for a specific reason. 
Garnet, one of the most famous of such scholars, advocated the use of ambi-
guity, or equivocation, in dangerous times, when one, who is in danger, needs 
to say something that contradicts his true beliefs. Garnet believed that the 
problem of such official self-denial may be solved by endowing one’s official, 
outwardly uttered, oath, or commitment, with an additional layer of intimate 
meaning that one keeps secretly in mind, in reservation, thereby confirming, 
not repealing, one’s true faith (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 207–210). In other 
words, the Jesuit scholar claimed that, should you succeed to ‘ambiguate’ 
your official message, a part of your heart would remain pure and devoted to 
your true, but now endangered, faith. The question of whether, and under 
what conditions, to equivocate while uttering an official oath or commitment 
gained prominence again in 1649, when another Oath was introduced, the 
Oath of Loyalty to the Republic, or Engagement Oath, following the execu-
tion of King Charles I and abolition of the House of Lords and Monarchy 
(Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 211).3 But, now, pro-royalists pondered over the 
question whether the Engagement Oath can be uttered in equivocal terms to 
safeguard secretly their own devotion and true faith. Interestingly, one of the 
most prominent defenders of the view that it can be so uttered was Robert 
Sanderson, an Oxford University Case Divinity Professor. Sanderson pro-
posed the use of ambiguity, and claimed that “the language of the Oath could 
be interpreted as compatible with allegiance to the king. The Oath contained 
key words that were in themselves ambiguous” (Jonsen and Toulmin 1988: 
212). This means that ambiguity again was treated as a useful means to hide 
something, to mislead one’s opponent and enable oneself to persist in an op-
position to those standing on the opposed side. Again, it is very unlikely that 
Hobbes was unaware of such issues pertaining to the daily English politics or 
of the notion of ambiguity such political practice was imbued with.
There is no doubt that Hobbes’s view of ambiguity, as a political prob-
lem, corresponds fully with the key points of the four examples given above. 
For instance, in his Leviathan he describes the attitude of the true Sovereign’s 
counselor to ambiguous expressions in the following way: “And therefore, 
rash and unevident inferences…, obscured, confused, and ambiguous expressions, 
also all metaphorical speeches, tending to the stirring up of passion (because such 
reasoning and such expressions are useful only to deceive, or to lead him 
we counsel towards other ends than his own) are repugnant to the office of a 
3 See also Skinner (2002c) on the importance of ‘engagement controversy’ for a deeper 
understanding of Leviathan. 
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counsellor” (Hobbes 1994: 169). Secondly, while discussing the difference 
between certain kinds of animals that live sociably and peaceably, on the one 
hand, and the human beings that are not political or social by nature, on the 
other, Hobbes (1994: 108) claims the following:
…these creatures, though they have some use of voice (in making known to one 
another their desires and other affections), yet they want that art of words by 
which some men can represent to others that which is good in the likeness of evil, 
and evil in the likeness of good, and augment or diminish the apparent greatness 
of good and evil, discontenting men, and troubling their peace at their pleasure.
Here again he refers to the power of ambiguous expressions, and metaphors, 
to mislead, deceive, and contribute to the emergence of conflict, war, sedi-
tion, or simply unease.4 The images of Delphic priests who represented to 
Croesus that which is evil in the likeness of good, and of Cleomenes who 
represented his soon-coming assault to the neighboring city in the likeness of 
a thirty-day truce, spring immediately to our mind.
There is also no doubt that Hobbes considers ambiguity as one of the 
key problems of political theory primarily because he describes it, in unmis-
takable terms, as one of the key causes of war, or as one of the key character-
istics of the State of Nature.
First, in Leviathan he puts it as clear as possible: “To conclude, the light 
of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact definitions first snuffed 
and purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace; increase of science the way; 
and the benefit of mankind the end. And on the contrary, metaphors, and 
senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui [a fool’s fire], and reason-
ing upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, 
contention and sedition, or contempt” (Hobbes 1994: 26).
Secondly, let us not forget the terms in which Hobbes, primarily in his 
Elements of Law, frames the State of Nature, the notion which is analyzed in 
more detail in Hoekstra (2007):
In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from 
other concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differen-
ces arise quarrels, and breach of peace; it was necessary there should be a com-
mon measure of all things that might fall in controversy; as for example: of what 
is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what meum 
and tuum, what a pound, what a quart, etc…This common measure, some say, 
is right reason: with whom I should consent, if there were any such thing to be 
found or known in rerum natura. But commonly they that call for right reason 
to decide any controversy, do mean their own. (quote in Tuck 1992: 171)
4 For a more detailed theoretical explanation, pertaining specifically to the cases of diplo-
matic ambiguity, see Pehar (2011: Part One). 
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Hobbes here pictures a paradigm of political conflict which not only 
draws on the unsettled meanings of words, names and appellations, but is 
also structurally equivalent to the conflict of interpretations over an ambigu-
ous expression. To any conflict of interpretations concerning an ambiguity, 
there are two sides and they both have some reasons to support one inter-
pretation they advocate; however, there are also reasons on the other side, 
and such reasons support the opposite interpretation of ambiguity. As such 
reasons and counter-reasons seem to be in balance, the only thing that feeds 
the conflict is the owning of the reasons, or counter-reasons, by either side. 
Such balance of reasons and counter-reasons, supporting an interpretation 
and counter-interpretation, is actually what makes ambiguity alive, difficult 
to handle, but also interesting. More importantly, we should have in mind 
that one of the answers Hobbes proposes to the aforementioned controversy 
is ‘laws as definitions,’ which is how one would typically react to the presence 
of an unsettled issue of ambiguity, that is, of equally viable, but opposed ways 
of meaning-attribution. One’s first reaction is to propose the exact meaning, 
in the form of a definition, of the ambiguous word/sentence/text over which 
a conflict of interpretations takes place. As Hobbes continues the above pas-
sage, “and by them [the laws] the use and definition of all names not agreed 
upon, and tending to controversy, shall be established. As for example, upon 
the occasion of some strange and deformed birth, it shall not be decided by 
Aristotle, or the philosophers, whether the same be a man or no, but by the 
laws” (Tuck 1992: 172).
Thirdly, in his 1668 Latin version of Leviathan Hobbes also claims that, 
in the State of Nature, “nothing is to be called unjust” (Hobbes 1994: 78), 
which implies that nothing is to be called just either. For any pair of descrip-
tions of actions, in the State of Nature the ambiguity applies. In other words, 
ambiguity characterizes the State of Nature in another way, through one’s in-
ability to defend unquestionably one’s interpretation of an action as belong-
ing to the category of ‘just’, or ‘unjust.’
Fourthly, and finally, Hobbes considers ambiguity as very detrimen-
tal, and very conducive to conflict, in another context. Imagine that we 
have a Sovereign, and imagine that we have a code of laws; that is, imagine 
that we have left, or traversed, the State of Nature, and are endowed with 
a rich cluster of laws. As Hobbes unmistakably suggests, the presence of 
ambiguity in such cluster, or code, of laws would undo the laws them-
selves. In other words, the presence of ambiguous provisions of the law 
contributes to our unfortunate return to the State of Nature, or the state 
of conflict. In Leviathan, Chap. xxx, 21 and 22, he argues in support of 
the perspicuity in the words of the law itself, and also of the brevity of the 
text of the law.
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…multiplication of words in the body of the law is multiplication of ambiguity; 
besides, it seems to imply (by too much diligence) that whosoever can evade the 
words is without the compass of the law. And this is a cause of many unneces-
sary processes. For when I consider how short were the laws of ancient times, 
and how they grew by degrees still longer, methinks I see a contention between 
the penners and pleaders of the law, the former seeking to circumscribe the lat-
ter, and the latter to evade their circumscriptions; and that the pleaders have got 
the victory. (Hobbes 1994: 229–230)
In other words, Hobbes here suggests that ambiguity lowers the binding 
force of the laws, and that the more ambiguity we identify in the text of the 
law the less bound we become by it, or, the less law-abiding citizenry overall 
we become. Again, when faced with ambiguity, our prospects of peace are 
slim indeed.5
Let us try now to interpret Hobbes’s political theory as a kind of grand 
theoretical response to the issue of political ambiguity. As will be shown in 
the next section, under such an interpretation, Hobbes’s theory seems to be 
incoherent, or, to put it more charitably, ambiguous itself.
Hobbes’s theory as a response to the problem of ambiguity
A part of Hobbes’s response to the issue of political ambiguity can be dis-
missed almost immediately. In some passages of Leviathan he claims that all 
verbal expressions are ambiguous. For instance, in Chap. xxvi 26 he claims 
the following: “The significations of almost all words are, either in themselves 
or in the metaphorical use of them, ambiguous, and may be drawn in argu-
ment to make many senses” (Hobbes 1994: 183). More explicitly, in Chap. 
xxx 22, he claims that, “all words are subject to ambiguity” (Hobbes 1994: 
229). Such a claim, however, cannot survive a closer scrutiny. First, it would 
imply that the very same claim is ambiguous too. In other words, the claim 
“all words are subject to ambiguity” is self-defeating. Secondly, we need to 
note that an attribution of ambiguity depends on a number of unambiguous 
sentences. First of all, to attribute an ambiguity one needs to spell out the 
potential interpretations of it; secondly, one needs to adduce some reasons in 
support of such interpretations, and finally, one needs to give some evidence 
for the conclusion that both interpretations and reasons stand in balance; 
otherwise, one of the interpretations should prevail thereby eliminating our 
attribution of the ambiguity in question. This, however, implies that the ra-
tio between ambiguities and non-ambiguities should be at least 5:1 in favor 
of non-ambiguities, in any language. Hence, theoretically it is impossible to 
claim that all, or almost all, words, or patterns of language, are ambiguous.
5 For more detail on Hobbes’s understanding of equivocal and ambiguous expressions, in 
the sense of philosophical/linguistic, not political, analysis, see Danford (1980: 123–125).
30 Prolegomena 13 (1) 2014
Secondly, a part of Hobbes’s response to the issue of political ambigu-
ity draws on the notion of positive, pro-life emotions. At the end of Chap. 
xiii, concerning the Natural Condition of Mankind, he claims that there are 
some passions that “incline men to peace”, and that those passions include 
primarily the following: “fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary 
for commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them” (Hob-
bes 1994: 78). This implies that a part of the mechanism that makes us tran-
scend, or traverse, the State of Nature, which implies a successful elimination 
of political ambiguity, must be placed in a better part of our passions, and 
must involve some emotional element (emphasized by Tuck 2004: esp.132–
135). However, this part of Hobbes’s answer is of little help as well, as ambi-
guity typically takes the form of a cognitive riddle that cannot be resolved by 
drawing simply on better passions of our nature. Hobbes was certainly aware 
of that; otherwise, he would not propose what is the most famous part of his 
response, the Construction of Leviathan, which is here taken as a third part 
of his response to the issue of political ambiguity.
In the Elements of Law, Hobbes, continuing the passage quoted above, 
proposes the introduction of sovereign power as a response to the problem of 
political ambiguity. He claims that, once the parties to the conflict concern-
ing an ambiguity realize that there is no such a thing as ‘right reason’ in rerum 
natura, that is, objectively, “the reason of some man, or men, must supply the 
place thereof [in the sense of making up a deficiency due to the lack of a right 
reason]; and that man, or men, is he or they that have the sovereign power” 
(Tuck 1992: 171). This means that the Sovereign Power, which he will later 
christen Leviathan, is introduced to serve as the ultimate interpreter, as the 
sovereign voice whose task is simply to resolve quarrels, and controversy, aris-
ing from the conflict of ‘names and appellations.’ S.S. Wolin (Wolin 2004: 
232) describes Hobbesian Sovereign as a ‘Great Definer,’ and such description 
is as pertinent as one can be. Such introduction of the Great Definer is an 
outcome of an original contract, the contract which turns a multitude of peo-
ple into a single political body, into a single Persona (in the sense of ‘Mask’, or 
an ‘Acting Role’) the living bearer of which is to be taken as the Sovereign, ac-
cording to Skinner (2007: esp. 168–175). Here I will not address the issue of 
Hobbes’s real allegiance, and whether he was really a monarchist, or whether 
he also considered a parliamentary Sovereign Power as equally legitimate to 
the royal power, a single person that bears the persona of a unified political 
body. I do not imply that such issues are not important, but they are not of 
direct relevance for the topic of this essay. There are, however, two issues, and 
themes, that are of direct relevance for the present considerations.
First, it is clear that the third, and most important, element of Hobbes’s 
response to the issue of ambiguity comes under a single heading of ‘Power.’ 
We resolve our interpretive disagreements by endowing ourselves with a 
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single, overarching and overwhelming power embodied in a single man, or 
a collective. The power of a single person, or of a collective body, will decide 
in the cases of interpretive disagreements, that is, he, or they, are those whose 
decision will eliminate ambiguity. The power of such a person, or persons, is, 
according to Hobbes, the greatest of human powers. The frontispiece of Le-
viathan (see Skinner 2008: 182–196) clearly says, in a Latin quote from the 
book of Job, that ‘Non est potestas Super Terram quae Comparetur ei’, ‘Upon 
earth there is no power that can be compared to him’, that is, to Leviathan. 
In Chap. x 3 of Leviathan Hobbes again clearly writes that “the greatest of hu-
man powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united 
by consent in one person, natural or civil…” (Hobbes 1994: 50) However, 
the most important thing to have in mind is that such power is inherently 
symbolic. The parties to the original contract agree to project their unified 
Persona into a single body; hence, the power of the Persona is symbolic and 
founded upon convention.
Secondly, if the Sovereign is introduced as a replacement, or supplement, 
for ‘right reason’, does this mean that the reasons the Sovereign offers in sup-
port of his considerations, laws, and decisions, may be subjective too? That 
is, should we take the transfer of authority to the Single Persona to imply 
that the parties to the original contract engage in a kind of ‘make-believe?’ In 
other words, should we take the parties as simply pretending that the right 
reason is coming from a single place, or voice, that they authorize to act as 
their Sovereign? Closely related to this, should we take the submission of the 
multitude to the single Sovereign to imply a kind of irrational obedience? 
More precisely, should we take the parties to the original covenant as pretend-
ing that they would submit fully to decisions by a single body, as required by 
the covenant, though their submission should not involve a deeper cognitive, 
or intellectual, consideration of the issues pertaining to the merely ‘make-
believe’ nature of Sovereign’s reasons? In other words, does the designation 
of the Sovereign Power as an ultimate interpreter imply our decision not to 
tackle, or engage in, the question of whether Sovereign’s ultimate interpreta-
tions draw on a set of objectively valid, inherently plausible, or defensible, 
reasons?
One can easily realize that Hobbes introduces the symbolic Sovereign 
Power to ensure a practical finality, or closure, of a conflict. The Power’s deci-
sion ought to settle and remove the issue, thus introducing or recovering sta-
bility, and, especially when it comes to the issue of interpretive disagreement 
or ambiguity, one’s decision needs to remove the ambiguity to resolve the case 
of disagreement. However, the finality of a resolution of the case of ambiguity 
needs to be also of theoretical nature. In other words, we need to see that such 
finality is acceptable in terms of theory; it needs to be immune, and proved 
to be immune to counter-reasons, or to alternative kinds of disambiguation/
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interpretation. Should the parties to the original covenant be concerned with 
theoretical finality at all? Or should they rather rest content with the practical 
finality of the Sovereign Decision/Definition, and take it as it stands, with-
out pondering over the issue of theoretical, and objectively/inter-subjectively 
valid, reason-grounded finality of the Sovereign Decision/Definition? Com-
mon-sense suggests that, when it comes to the issue of interpretive disagree-
ment, theoretical finality must be ranked higher than, and prior to, practical 
finality. Unless a decision concerning a resolution of ambiguity is theoreti-
cally sound, it cannot be taken as final in practical sense. Theoretical finality 
is a guarantor of practical finality, and not the other way around. However, 
the presence of Sovereign Power suggests that it is the other way around.
Contrary to the conventional and established ways of interpreting of 
Hobbes, and contrary to the established image of Hobbes as an authoritarian 
in disguise and/or anti-republican (Pettit 2008: 153), Hobbes was not only 
deeply concerned with the aforementioned issues of ‘make-believe’, of merely 
arbitrary or non-arbitrary nature of Sovereign decisions, and of theoretical vs. 
practical finality; but, a part of his response to the issue of political ambigu-
ity can in no way be reduced to the heading of ‘Sovereign Power.’ As I argue 
in the next three paragraphs, the fourth element of his response to the issue 
of ambiguity goes under the heading of ‘unwritten laws of nature,’ and this 
element sits very uneasily with, and can be perhaps taken as opposed to, the 
response in terms of Sovereign Power.6
1) Sovereign’s primary task is to pass a set of laws. As Hobbes argues, 
the Sovereign primarily acts as a legislator. The laws should play the role of a 
primary ‘disambiguator’ of the ambiguities that are harmful to a civil society, 
or commonwealth. However, Hobbes also argues that all laws are in need of 
interpretation. In other words, the application of the laws, in specific cases 
of adjudication, depends fully on the ways of legal interpretation. Hobbes 
furthermore argues that the task of legal interpretation is clearly in hands 
of the judges, and those need to be authorized to act as such by a Sovereign 
Power. Of course, while interpreting the laws, the judges must not go against 
the intentions of the legislator, or the Sovereign. As Leviathan xxvi 20 put it: 
“For else, by the craft of an interpreter the law may be made to bear a sense 
contrary to that of the sovereign, by which means the interpreter becomes 
the legislator.” (Hobbes 1994: 180) Hence, the power of interpretation of 
the laws is in the hands of the judges. However, what exactly ought to be 
interpreted, and, more importantly, how? Hobbes provides the following 
answer.
6 Hence, my reading of Hobbes is, in its tone and general direction, similar to Zarka 
(2004) and Gauthier (1995: esp. 34–36).
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All laws, written and unwritten, have need of interpretation. The unwritten 
law of nature, though it be easy to such without partiality and passion make 
use of their natural reason, and therefore leaves the violators thereof without 
excuse, yet considering there be very few, perhaps none that in some cases are 
not blinded by self love or some other passion, it is now become of all laws the 
most obscure, and has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters. The 
written laws, if they be short, are easily misinterpreted from the divers significa-
tions of a word or two. (Hobbes 1994: 180)
2) In other words, all laws, written and unwritten, require interpreta-
tion. However, when a judge interprets, it is certain that his interpretation 
of a written law needs to draw on his interpretation of an unwritten law. 
Any interpretation needs to draw on a pool of factors that are, at least partly, 
external to a body of a legal text. One could claim that one can also draw on 
the contextual factors that are inherent to the body of legal text, for instance, 
on the laws textually preceding the law in question, or on a preamble; howe-
ver, this would imply that one would not need the notion of unwritten laws 
at all, which contravenes Hobbes’s key claims. Hobbes additionally specifies 
the nature of the interpretation of the unwritten law of nature. He claims in 
Leviathan xxvi 23 that,
the interpretation of the law of nature is the sentence of the judge constituted 
by the sovereign authority to hear and determine such controversies as depend 
thereon, and consisteth in the application of the law to the present case. For in 
the act of judicature the judge doth no more but consider, whether the demand 
of the party be consonant to natural reason and equity. (Hobbes 1994: 181)
Most importantly, however, Hobbes adds even more precision to the task of 
the judge as an interpreter of the unwritten laws of nature. In Leviathan xxvi 
26, he claims that,
now the intention of the legislator is always supposed to be equity; for it were 
a great contumely [insult] for a judge to think otherwise of the sovereign. He 
ought, therefore, if the word of the law do not fully authorize a reasonable sen-
tence, to supply it with the law of nature; or if the case be difficult, to respite 
judgment till he has received more ample authority. (Hobbes 1994: 183)
3) Hence, the final image one gets of the unwritten laws of nature, as 
the fourth part of Hobbes’s response to the issue of ambiguity, is as follows. 
The Sovereign ‘supplies’ the place of right reason. The right reason takes the 
form of civil laws. But, civil laws require able interpreters in the figure of 
judges authorized by the Sovereign. The judges interpret the civil laws in the 
light of the unwritten laws of nature, in accordance with natural reason and 
equity. Hence, we end up with the judges ‘supplying’ the Sovereign’s laws 
with the laws of nature, in the light of natural reasons and, most importantly, 
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of the principle of equity.7 In other words, when it comes to the final step of 
the Sovereign decision, it must ensure theoretical, not only practical finality. 
The latter is a side-effect of the former. The unwritten laws of nature, those 
‘theorems of peace,’ as Hobbes named them, shed the decisive light on the 
civil laws passed by the sovereign, and the light they shed must be the light 
of natural reason, that is, the “right reason” in the objective sense of the word 
that is independent of the will of the Sovereign (see also Boyle 1987). It is 
only under such an interpretation that we can understand fully, and not be 
taken by surprise at, the following passage from Leviathan (xxvi 24):
But because there is no judge, subordinate nor sovereign, but may err in a judg-
ment of equity, if afterward, in another like case, he find it more consonant to 
equity to give a contrary sentence, he is obliged to do it. No man’s error becomes 
his own law, nor obliges him to persist in. Neither (for the same reason) becomes 
it a law to other judges, though sworn to follow it. For though a wrong sentence 
given by authority of the sovereign, if he know and allow it, in such laws as are 
mutable, be a constitution of a new law in cases in which every little circum-
stance is the same, yet in laws immutable (such as are the laws of nature) they are 
no laws to the same or other judges in the like cases for ever after. Princes suc-
ceed one another; and one judge passeth, another cometh; nay, heaven and earth 
shall pass; but not one title of the law of nature shall pass, for it is the eternal law 
of God. Therefore, all the sentences of the precedent judges that have ever been 
cannot all together make a law contrary to natural equity, nor any examples of 
former judges can warrant an unreasonable sentence, or discharge the present 
judge of the trouble of studying what is equity (in the case he is to judge) from 
the principles of his own natural reason. (Hobbes 1994: 181)
Therefore, Hobbes’s response to the problem of political ambiguity pro-
vides us with two figures. One figure is the figure of Supreme Power, the 
Great Definer, or the ultimate voice that needs to be obeyed. The primary 
task of the figure is to ensure practical finality to an interpretive conflict. 
The second figure is the figure of a judge relying on his own natural reason. 
He is a figure figuring as a scholar who needs to reflect on the decisions, and 
the reasons offered, by the others, and to self-reflect on the reasons that he, 
or she, offers himself.8 The eyes of such a judge are focused primarily on 
the unwritten laws of nature, and his sentences are committed primarily to 
the eternal law of God that is immutable, in contrast to the princes who are 
mutable and ‘succeed one another.’ The primary task of the second figure 
7 This is why, in my view, there is no significant difference between Hobbes’s Sovereign 
Persona and ‘liberal umpire’ as proposed by Gerald Gaus (2003: 218–229). 
8 It is for such a reason that Hobbes (1994: 184) also claims that a judge needs to be 
endowed with some particular virtues: “a right understanding of that principal law of nature 
called equity…contempt of unnecessary riches and preferments…to be able in judgment to divest 
himself of all fear, anger, hatred, love, and compassion…patience to hear; diligent attention in hear-
ing; and memory to retain, digest and apply what he hath heard.” 
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is to ensure theoretical finality to an interpretive conflict. It seems now that 
Hobbes provides us with two figures that cannot, and perhaps should not, 
live together.
Hobbes, in his Review and Conclusion to Leviathan, famously presented 
the core of his argument as being in support of a contract in which obedience 
to the Sovereign is traded for protection, or, in his more precise terms, life and 
liberty of the Sovereign’s subjects (Hobbes 1994: 491). Now, what if one senses 
that he, or she, was not fairly protected by some adjudication to which s/he was 
a party? Hobbes’s total response to the problem of political ambiguity would 
deliver a contradictory guideline. On the one hand, if such adjudication had 
been delivered by the judges who are currently on top, the subject should be 
considered as sufficiently protected, hence, as owing his or her obedience, and 
submission, to the Sovereign. On the other hand, if such adjudication had been 
found unfair, under the immutable laws of God, by another judge, who took his 
post a bit later, then the subject should not be considered as legally protected; 
hence, the contract, through which s/he traded her obedience for protection, 
seems to have ceased to bind her. Now, the question is of who should, and more 
importantly how to, decide in such cases of supreme ambiguity?
Hobbes’s theory seems to offer a contradictory answer to the question. 
The contradiction in the answer, however, is informative, and the next sec-
tion will make an attempt at explaining why this is so. It will also attempt 
to explain the internal link between the considerations concerning Hobbes’s 
response to the problem of ambiguity, on the one hand, and the argument 
proposed on the first page of this essay, on the other.
The question of ultimate interpreter and a cluster of further 
legal/ethical arguments and issues
Imagine now that, instead of ‘Leviathan’, we read ‘Supreme Court.’ Imagine 
also that there are several branches of government, according to the rule of 
the separation of powers. Furthermore, those branches disagree over the issue 
of how to interpret a particularly complex, and ambiguous, constitutional 
provision. Should we assign to the Supreme Court the role of the ultimate in-
terpreter, or, ‘the Guardian of the Constitution?’9 Let us note that assignment 
of such a role to the body corresponds fully with the move described by point 
c) of my opening argument. How should Hobbes respond to the question, 
and, more importantly, how should we respond to it?
As explained in the previous section, Hobbes endorses a contradictory 
guideline. Hence, a part of his answer is emphatically ‘yes, we should assign 
9 I think that, even if and when we replace ‘Supreme Court’ with ‘Parliament,’ the argu-
ment proposed here applies invariably. 
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such a role to the said body, and such a body would have the status of Levia-
than.’ Another part of his answer, however, consists in the recognition that 
the judges, and princes, may err, and that the judge should figure primarily 
as a scholar who, exploring his own natural reason, and pondering over the 
reasons and counter-reasons in the light of the unwritten laws of nature, does 
his best to deliver the most plausible theory of the constitutional provision 
in question, but may err too. In other words, if the task of the ultimate inter-
preter is inherently theoretical, then we need to view him, or her, or them, as 
guided only by the interplay between reasons and counter-reasons. Provided 
that the previous claim is valid, nothing can prevent another body, or indi-
vidual, to influence the reasoning of the judge/interpreter, to enter the game 
of ultimate interpretation with his own counter-reasons, or alternative views 
and interpretations. Hence, this part of Hobbes’s answer seems to imply that 
it does not make sense to designate beforehand an institutional body whose 
task would be to deliver the ultimate interpretation. In other words, this part 
of Hobbes’s answer suggests to one to meet the move described in point c) of 
the opening argument of this essay with skeptical eye.
Therefore, a particularly interesting aspect of the incoherent, or ambigu-
ous, character of Hobbes’s theory of political ambiguity consists in the fact 
that it puts pressure on one to make a reasoned choice, to weigh the arguments 
and counter-arguments for, and against, both parts of Hobbes’s theory.
The opening argument of this essay obviously sides with the second part 
of Hobbes’s answer. It subscribes to the claim that, whichever body we choose 
to play the role of ultimate interpreter, we make a wrong move by doing so. 
Any interpreter needs to offer some arguments, and counter-arguments, in 
favor of some interpretations, and against some. This implies that his work, 
the work of Hobbesian judge, is fully determined by the flow of reasons and 
counter-reasons. Now, designation of a body, or an individual, as the ultimate 
interpreter implies that we have decided beforehand to take his, or their, 
interpretations as ultimate and unquestionable. It implies that, even if we 
had strong counter-reasons, or perhaps more plausible interpretations, and 
views, in our pockets, the body has got the power not to take such counter-
reasons, or interpretations, into account. In other words, by assigning to a 
body the role of an ultimate interpreter, we have decided to deprive ourselves 
of the right to call the body to book. We have decided to stop the flow of the 
argument quite arbitrarily, and to perform an arbitrary closure of the space 
of argumentation, sometimes perhaps even at our own cost. In other words, 
the move as described in point c) ought to be considered as an instance of, in 
terms of Philip Pettit (Pettit 2001: 67–79, and Pettit 2004: 77), “discourse-
unfriendly influence.” Instead of continuing with the discourse along the 
reasons, and counter-reasons offered, and with the debate, reflecting further 
on some alternative views, and additional reasons, or reframing of reasons, we 
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have decided to stop it and to close our mouth at the time when some more 
words would like to, and perhaps should, come through it.10
Hence, designation of an ultimate interpreter is a wrong, harmful, and 
highly (discourse-) unethical move, under the stipulated preference for the 
fourth part of Hobbes’s response to the issue of political ambiguity.11 This 
means that the question of who should act as the ultimate conflict resolver, 
as the ultimate interpreter for a highly polarized conflict of interpretations 
concerning a constitutional ambiguity, simply cannot be answered a priori. 
We cannot answer it with the thesis of the people as the ultimate interpreter, 
because, first, such answer is vague, and, secondly, because it means that a 
numerical might, perhaps a two-third majority, should decide over the is-
sue which requires an exclusively theoretical approach, and may be decided 
only by the adducing of reasons and counter-reasons. The only viable answer 
would amount to the claim that the ultimate interpreter is one offering the 
best reasons for his theory/interpretation of the constitutional provision in 
question, or of the cluster of norms that support such provision. However, 
there is no way for one to determine in advance who should, or would, such 
a person, or a group of persons, be.12
This also implies that, when it comes to the key theoretical issues per-
taining to the US politics, the five-step argument obviously lends support 
to those who argue against the claim that the US Supreme Court should, or 
already does, play the role of the ultimate interpreter of the US Constitution, 
or of the Guardian of the Constitution. The argument sides with Jefferson, 
against Hamilton, and it sides with Robert A Burt’s views of both the US 
Constitution and the US Supreme Court. Burt claims that we should resist 
the idea of a single locus of interpretive sovereignty. The view he endorses, and 
which he attributes both to James Madison and Abraham Lincoln, is to the 
10 Typically such a condition involves endorsement of the following view: “Even when 
we believe that the umpire gets it wrong, we still have reason to accept his judgment, for gen-
erally we need some practical resolution of our dispute” (as put and endorsed by Gaus 2003: 
219); however, the contradiction such a view implies should escape nobody’s attention. 
11 For a classical statement of the norms of discourse-ethics, see Habermas (1983: 96–
104) in contrast to Habermas, I prefer speaking of the values of discourse, rather than norms 
(see Pehar 2011: 158–184), but, for the purpose of this essay, this is of minor importance. 
12 If I interpret his or her words correctly, one reviewer objected to this by posing the 
standard claim that designation of a limited body of de facto ultimate interpreters should be 
taken as justified in the conditions of a deep and enduring indeterminacy that is deemed to 
underlie really hard legal and moral cases/dilemmas; for instance, those revolving around the 
issues of pornography or perhaps euthanasia, or perhaps abortion. Strictly logically speaking, 
the condition of indeterminacy amounts to the condition of ignorance, and the latter by itself 
justifies nothing. Furthermore, once we give a license to a body to issue an arbitrary decision 
in such condition of indeterminacy, what should, in terms of rationality, prevent an alternative 
body from issuing an alternative and competing decision in the very same condition? 
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effect that constitutional interpretation “takes place over time, not in a single 
instant at a fixed and privileged locus of interpretive authority” (Burt 1992: 
68), and that “the institutional competitors for interpretive authority must be 
linked together in an inextricably nested relationship, so that each would see 
its interdependence with the others and all would accordingly work toward 
mutual accommodation” (Burt 1992: 68–9). The US Supreme Court at their 
best is a court which is self-restrained, which delivers its decisions not in the 
form of verdicts, or ultimate and unquestionable adjudications, but in the 
form of accommodating proposals, or suggestions for consideration by the 
other branches of government, as perhaps exemplified by Brown vs. Board of 
Education I and II according to Burt (Burt 1992: 275). Such a view is also 
shared, and presented in a similar form, by Devins and Fisher (2004).
The argument presented here also implies that those who view the US 
Supreme Court with some reverence, including P. Pettit (see Pettit 2006: 
308) are somewhat mistaken, and that, whenever the Supreme Court itself 
backs its own decision by stating “we are the ultimate interpreters of the US 
Constitution,”13 it performs an arbitrary closure of the space of argumenta-
tion and commands to us to deny our own right to call any institutional 
body, or an official, to book. The argument also implies that the following 
words from 1849 by Justice Taney (as quoted by Wechsler 1999: 311), “that 
it be regarded hereafter as the law of this court [US Supreme Court], that its 
opinion upon the construction of the Constitution is always open to discus-
sion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that its judicial 
authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by 
which it is supported,” should evoke an utter sympathy.14
In the following, I make an attempt to explain where the ambiguity in 
Hobbes’s response to the problem of ambiguity comes from, and I conclude 
with a proposal that, in my view, may serve to blunt the razor of the opening 
argument.
In a recent book Philip Pettit (Pettit 2008) has skillfully offered a reading 
of Hobbes the focus of which is primarily on Hobbes’s view of language, and 
13 Actually, the US Supreme Court itself issued such a statement on a few occasions, for 
which see Devins and Fisher (2004: 222–224).
14 To an informed reader this should immediately serve as a reminder that Taney in 1857 
delivered the notorious Dred Scott v. Sandford US Supreme Court Decision, which brings to 
awareness the following two points: 1. When a supreme court (or any other institutionally 
designated body) adjudicates or makes a decision that is not supported by reasons, or is sup-
ported by an implausible or epistemically unsound chain of reasoning, there is no way for the 
court to retain the status of an ultimate interpreter across a sufficiently wide spectrum of body 
politic; 2. Contrary to an objection by a Prolegomena reviewer to the effect that the view I 
propose here potentially leads to anarchy, decisions by an ultimate interpreter, within a suf-
ficiently polarized political environment, have the potential not only to lead to anarchy, but to 
contribute causally to an outbreak of civil war as well. 
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the use of language in social/political setting. Pettit argues in support of the 
thesis of ‘language as desire-warping device’ in Hobbes (Pettit 2008: 84–97). 
In other words, according to Pettit, Hobbes’s view of language in the State of 
Nature is very negative; language does more bad than good because it acts as a 
contributory cause to a number of desires that sustain the Natural Condition 
of Mankind. For instance, Pettit claims that ‘positional desire’ (to be ranked 
higher than the others, or to enjoy more fame), which is one of the factors 
sustaining the State of Nature, requires the use of language, and is possible 
only in the language-using creatures (Pettit 2008: 92–6).
However, I think that the story on Hobbes’s view of language is more 
complicated than one Pettit proposes. In my opinion, Hobbes held an am-
biguous, or, more precisely, contradictory view of language, and this can help 
us explain the dual, or contradictory, nature of his response to the problem of 
political ambiguity. In brief, Hobbes held both normative and non-norma-
tive view of language.
In normative view, the use of language is intrinsically tied to some mor-
ally valuable goals, such as truth-telling, sincerity, accuracy, coherence, the 
articulation of, and a responsible influence through, reasons, and promise-
fulfillment.15 The use of language as such is pulling us towards such goals; 
hence, it is naturally endowed with a normative force. It is a norm for hu-
man beings, as the users of language, to express sincerely their attitudes, to 
inform each other as accurately and truthfully as possible about the state of 
affairs, or to bind their future actions through their words that have the sta-
tus and role of promises. There are a number of passages in Hobbes’s works 
that clearly attests to his endorsement of such view of language. For instance, 
he used the phrase ‘abuses of speech’ (that include telling lies, and inducing 
hatred or unease in the others by speech, and using ambiguity to mislead 
one) (Hobbes 1994: 17), which clearly implies a normative perspective on 
the use of language. Secondly, and in support of normative view of language, 
he famously compared one’s failure to fulfill one’s promises, or to act accord-
ing to an oath, with absurdity in the sense of contradiction. He called such 
failure Injury, according to its Latin etymology, and stated that Injury equals 
Absurdity, that is, it is as irrational, hence condemnable, as is a contradiction 
(Hobbes 1994: 81).
However, Hobbes, on the other side, also speaks of language in purely 
instrumental, non-normative, and value-neutral terms. Again famously, he 
claims that “by oratio man is not made better but only given greater possibili-
ties” (originally in his De Homine 10.3; a quote in Pettit 2008: 97). In other 
15 For exemplary statements of such a view of language, see Habermas (1983) Williams 
(2002) and Donald Davidson’s ‘principle of charity’ on which see, for example, Joseph (2004: 
62–70). 
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words, when we compare human beings with other animals, we see that, 
from the perspective of morality, language is often used as a means to achieve 
questionable goals. This, which contravenes the normative view, for Hobbes 
means that language is only an instrument that can be used both for good 
and evil ends, that there is nothing inherent in language itself that could pull 
human beings towards an ethical, virtuous, or valuable, and norm-abiding, 
conduct, as also emphasized in Tuck (1996: 180–183).
The best example of such perspective on language consists in a number 
of Hobbes’s claims concerning the power of word, the claims that in fact 
serve as premises for his construction of Leviathan as the Sovereign Power. 
In Leviathan, in a number of passages, he claims that words are too weak to 
determine human conduct, which simply means that human beings overall 
consider words, or language, as being of minor importance, and of a small 
and limited binding force. For instance, in Leviathan xiv 18 Hobbes claims 
that “the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men’s ambition, avarice, 
anger, and other passions, without the fear of some coercive power…” (Hob-
bes 1994: 84) In Leviathan xiv 7, he points out that “nothing is more easily 
broken than a man’s word” (Hobbes 1994: 81). And in Leviathan xiv 31 he 
repeats, “the force of words being (as I have formerly noted) too weak to hold 
men to the performance of their covenants…” (Hobbes 1994: 87)
One needs to note here two things. First, if one endorses non-norma-
tive view, then the construction of Leviathan seems to be in order. If one 
endorses the view that human beings generally tend to break their promises, 
or to fail to perform their covenants, then it seems that some external and 
coercive power is really needed. In other words, the door is now widely open 
to the construction of Leviathan who will back by his swords the covenants 
that are merely words. This, however, implies that the part of Hobbes’s re-
sponse to the problem of political ambiguity, which is couched in terms of 
the Sovereign, and Unquestionable, Power (or the Ultimate Interpreter), fully 
depends on a non-normative view of language he endorsed, and added to the 
premises for his construction of the Sovereign. On the other hand, he cannot 
fully deny the normative view of language primarily for the following reason. 
There is no a Sovereign above the Sovereign. Hence, the Sovereign’s words 
must be of different character than the words of those whose ambition can-
not be bridled by words. The Sovereign must bind himself by his words as he 
is the ultimate coercive power over which there is no another, superior power 
to supervise his verbal expressions. This means that the Sovereign must stand 
by his words, and that his words must correspond with the eternal, immu-
table laws of nature that are the laws of God in Hobbes’s terminology. Now, 
the virtues, or moral norms, that underlie the use of language seem to have 
been smuggled through the backdoor. This, and only this, can explain why 
the second part of Hobbes’s response to the problem of political ambiguity 
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is couched in normative terms, why he required from the judges to exercise 
some special judicial virtues, and why he called on them to rely on their own 
natural reason, together with the unwritten laws of nature.16
This is also closely related to the opening argument of this essay. For 
those who hold normative view of language, the step e) of the argument will 
seem plausible. However, for those who endorse non-normative view, the step 
c) will read as fully acceptable.17 If our use of language is not characterized 
by inherent normative force, there is nothing to prevent the designated body 
from acting as the final decision maker in the matters of interpretive conflict, 
whose words are final in a practical sense, which, within such perspective, is 
the only thing that matters.
Lastly, there is probably only one way in which one can try to blunt the 
razor of the five-step argument from the first page of this essay. We strictly ad-
here to the thesis of the primacy of theoretical finality over the practical one. 
In other words, if a body delivers the most plausible, the soundest theory, 
then we take it to be the body which also achieved practical finality and, thus, 
in this particular case conformed to, and confirmed, its status. This means 
that the status of the body as an ultimate interpreter should fully depend 
on its theoretical performance. The status tracks the performance measured 
by the means and terms of theory, of reasons and counter-reasons, and not 
the other way around. Should the body under-achieve, or fail to deliver an 
interpretive result that is satisfactory in terms of theory, we simply refuse to 
recognize it as the body in question. In the case of its under-performance, the 
Supreme Court, for instance, should be generally taken as having deprived 
itself of the status of an ultimate interpreter by having missed the theoretical 
target. In other words, we decide to designate a body to perform the tasks de-
fined by steps a) and b), but also endow it only with a notional, or potential, 
status and role. This would mean rescuing a part, or the appearance, of our 
current, conventional, pre-given landscape of political practice, but it would 
be a rescue in a minimal and very roundabout sense.
16 Therefore, one should not find it surprising that Hobbes frames the concept of law 
not only in terms of ‘chains’, or ‘bonds’, as it is generally believed, but also (in Latin version of 
Leviathan) in terms of ‘hedges’ the purpose of which is “not to restrain people from harmless 
liberty, but to prevent them from rushing into dangers or harm to themselves or the com-
monwealth, from impetuous passions, rashness, or foolishness, as roads are hedged not as 
an obstacle to travelers, but to prevent them from wandering off, with injury to their fellow 
citizens” (Hobbes 1994: 229). I was unable to find any reference to the metaphor of ‘laws as 
hedges’ in Skinner (2008). 
17 One Prolegomena reviewer objected that my analysis could be characterized as ‘overly 
optimistic.’ That is why I think that the readers need to keep firmly in mind that the distinc-
tion which is of major importance for the analysis proposed here is not one between ‘optimis-
tic’ and ‘pessimistic (or less optimistic) view’ in a political sense, but, more specifically, one 
between a normative and non-normative stand on language. 
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